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Abstract: Water quality sensors are often spatially distributed in water distribution systems 32 
(WDSs) to detect contamination events and monitor quality parameters (e.g., chlorine residual 33 
levels), thereby ensuring safety of a WDS. The performance of a water quality sensor placement 34 
strategy (WQSPS) is not only affected by sensor spatial deployment that has been extensively 35 
analyzed in literature, but also by possible sensor failures that have been rarely explored so far. 36 
However, enumerating all possible sensor failure scenarios is computationally infeasible for a 37 
WQSPS with a large number of sensors. To this end, this paper proposes an evolutionary algorithm 38 
(EA) based method to systematically and efficiently investigate the WQSPS’ global resilience 39 
considering  sensor failures. First, new metrics are developed in the proposed method to assess the 40 
global resilience of a WQSPS. This is followed by a proposal of an efficient optimization approach 41 
based on an EA to identify the values of global resilience metrics. Finally, the sensors within the 42 
WQSPS are ranked to identify their relative importance in maintaining the WQSPS’s detection 43 
performance. Two real-world WDSs with four WQSPSs for each case study are used to 44 
demonstrate the utility of the proposed method. Results show that: (i) compared to the traditional 45 
global resilience analysis method, the proposed EA-based approach identifies improved values of 46 
global resilience metrics, (ii) the WQSPSs that deploy sensors close to large demand users are 47 
overall more resilient in handling sensor failures relative to other design solutions, thus offering 48 
important insight to facilitate the selection of WQSPSs, and (iii) sensor rankings based on the 49 
global resilience can identify those sensors whose failure would significantly reduce the 50 
WQSPS’s performance thereby providing guidance to enable effective water quality sensor 51 
management and maintenance.  52 
Keywords: Global resilience; Contamination intrusion; Water quality sensor placement strategy; 53 
Water distribution system 54 
1. Introduction 55 
A water distribution system (WDS) is a network that is responsible for delivering drinking water 56 
produced at treatment plants to end users (Zheng et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2018). Because of a large 57 
spatial coverage and complex structures, WDSs are highly vulnerable to intentional or accidental 58 
contamination intrusion (Yang and Boccelli 2016; Zheng et al., 2018). A recent intrusion incident 59 
was reported in May 2016 in Beijing, China, where a large amount of reclaimed water entered into 60 
the WDS due to the misconnection between reclaimed and drinking water supply pipes 61 
(ChinaNews, 2016). The event had not been detected for a while and has resulted in severe public 62 
health hazard. This highlights the great importance and necessity to efficiently identify 63 
contamination intrusion incidents, thereby minimizing the potential impacts of these events 64 
(Ostfeld et al., 2004). To achieve this objective, water quality sensors are often placed within the 65 
WDSs (i.e., type of sensors and their deployments) to form a contamination early warning system, 66 
aimed to ensure potential intrusion events can be detected and a warning can be provided to the 67 
public in an efficient manner (Wu and Walski, 2006; Hart and Murray, 2010; Kroll and King 2010; 68 
Hu et al., 2017; Soldevila et al., 2018). However, due to the high cost associated with water quality 69 
sensors, it is impossible to deploy them at all possible locations in a large WDS (Zhao et al., 2016). 70 
This consequently motivates studies to investigate optimal deployment of a limited number of 71 
sensors in the WDSs aimed at maximizing their performance in detecting water quality issues 72 
(Rathi et al., 2015). 73 
Identifying water quality sensor placement strategies (WQSPS) typically involves formulating an 74 
optimization problem (Oliker and Ostfeld, 2014). Over the past decade, a number of different 75 
optimization objective functions have been developed to maximize the detection ability of the 76 
limited number of water quality sensors. These include the minimization of the detection time 77 
(Ostfeld et al., 2004), the maximization of the detection coverage (Rathi et al., 2015), the 78 
minimization of affected users (Aral et al., 2010), the minimization of sensor redundancy (Tinelli 79 
et al., 2018), the minimization of the maximum possible influence expressed as the event with the 80 
highest consequence (Watson et al., 2009), the minimization of the mean extent of the potential 81 
source area and redundant detection (Van, 2014) as well as the minimization of the risk of 82 
contamination (Weickgenannt et al 2010). It has been demonstrated that the use of different 83 
objective functions can lead to significantly different WQSPSs, and hence it is often difficult to 84 
identify a single WQSPS that can ensure all these objectives are optimized (Zheng et al., 2018). To 85 
address this issue, the methods of integrating multiple objectives through weighting approaches or 86 
simultaneously considering multiple objectives within the optimization framework are adopted to 87 
account for the trade-offs between different objectives (He et al., 2018).  88 
In parallel with the development of objective functions, many optimization techniques have been 89 
proposed to enable these objective functions to be effectively minimized/maximized (Berry et al., 90 
2005; Bahadur et al., 2003; Hart and Murray, 2010). Among these optimization methods, 91 
Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) have gained in popularity due to their strong search ability as well 92 
as their flexibility in linking to water quality simulation models (e.g., EPANET2.0, Ostfeld et al., 93 
2008). The practical applications of EAs to identify optimal WQSPSs are often challenged by their 94 
low computational efficiency especially when dealing with large WDSs (Zheng et al., 2017). This 95 
is because the EA search mechanisms are stochastically based and hence they need to call 96 
continuously the water quality simulation model (that is often computationally expensive) to 97 
enable the calculations of objective functions (Hart and Murray, 2010). To overcome this issue, 98 
continuous efforts have been made to improve the optimization efficiency with the aid of many 99 
techniques, including graph theory (Perelman and Ostfeld, 2011), preconditioning methods (Huang 100 
and Mcbean, 2006; Diao and Rauch, 2013), surrogate models (Bi and Dandy, 2015), data-archive 101 
methods (He et al., 2018) and sampling methods (Tinelli et al. 2017).  102 
Given the selected objective function and the optimization algorithm as mentioned above, optimal 103 
WQSPSs that have the best overall performance in detecting water quality issues can be identified 104 
for the WDS. However, it should be noted that the WQSPS’ performance is not only affected by 105 
spatial sensor deployment, but can also be substantially influenced by sensor failures (e.g., 106 
structural failures and communication failures). Failures of water quality sensors are not 107 
uncommon within practical applications, as they can be caused by internal structural failures, 108 
measurement errors, or communication failures (Berry et al., 2009). These failures can 109 
significantly reduce the performance of the optimal WQSPS that is identified based on the 110 
assumption that all water quality sensors can consistently provide accurate measurements (Berry et 111 
al., 2009). Therefore, there is a need to consider the resilience during the selection of WQSPSs, 112 
thereby ensuring the system performs well not only under normal conditions (perfectly working 113 
sensors), but also maintains acceptable functionality levels during unexpected conditions that lead 114 
to sensor failures.  115 
Resilience in engineering community is often defined as a system’s ability to ensure the continuity 116 
and efficiency of its function during and after the failure (Mugume et al., 2015). This concept has 117 
now been considered in some engineering domains, such as urban drainage systems (Mugume et 118 
al., 2015), water supply systems (Diao et al., 2016; Meng et al., 2018) and wastewater systems 119 
(Sweetapple et al., 2019). However, to the best of our knowledge, the WQSPS’s resilience that 120 
accounts for sensor failures has been rarely investigated so far, and hence there is still a lack of 121 
suitable method for resilience quantification. While Preis and Ostfeld (2008) and Berry et al. 122 
(2009) have made attempts to consider sensor failures during the selection/assessment of WQSPSs, 123 
they assume a known and fixed failure likelihood for each water quality sensor. However, these 124 
approaches only considered a narrow range of possible sensor failures, and hence the results can 125 
only represent a limited view of resilience (Mugume et al., 2015). Given that the failure 126 
probability of each sensor as well as the total number of failed sensors is actually unknown and 127 
unpredictable, it is ideal to explicitly consider all possible failure scenarios, thereby quantifying 128 
the global resilience of the WQSPS in coping with possible sensor failures (Butler et al., 2014; 129 
Diao et al., 2016). However, enumerating all possible sensor failure scenarios is often 130 
computationally infeasible for WQSPSs with a large number of sensors. To this end, this study 131 
proposes an EA-based method to investigate the global resilience of WQSPSs considering all 132 
sensor failure scenarios. 133 
Rather than quantifying the probability of occurrence of sensor failures, which are highly uncertain, 134 
the proposed global resilience evaluation method considers the system performance as a result of 135 
sensor failure scenarios irrespective of their occurrence probability (Diao et al., 2016). The 136 
specific contributions/novelties of the present study are as follows: 137 
(i) The proposal of new metrics to assess the global resilience of WQSPSs under different 138 
sensor failure levels (i.e., the number of failed sensors). In this study, assessment metrics 139 
are proposed to measure quantitatively the WQSPS’s global resilience under different 140 
sensor failure levels, where the impacts of different number of sensor failure scenarios on 141 
the WQSPS’s ability to detect contamination intrusions are considered, irrespective of their 142 
occurrence probability.  143 
(ii) The development of a novel EA-based optimization approach to identify the values of the 144 
global resilience metrics for different sensor failure levels. To demonstrate the utility of the 145 
proposed EA-based method (EAM), its performance is compared with the traditional global 146 
resilience analysis (TGRA) approach (Diao et al., 2016) in capturing the impact extents of 147 
the failure scenarios. 148 
(iii) Identification of the relative importance of the sensors in maintaining the WQSPS’s 149 
detection performance based on the global resilience metric values. This also helps 150 
improving knowledge of the underlying system properties of the WQSPSs as well as 151 
offering important guidance for the management and maintenance of water quality sensor 152 
systems.  153 
This paper is organized as follows. The proposed methodology is described in Section 2, where the 154 
definition of the global resilience metrics and the proposed EAM are presented. This is followed by 155 
the descriptions of the case studies considered in Section 3, and results and discussions in Section 4. 156 
Finally, the conclusion section (Section 5) shows the main observations and implications of this 157 
paper.  158 
2. Methodology 159 
2.1 Global resilience metrics for WQSPSs 160 
2.1.1 Global resilience metrics definition 161 
The proposed global resilience metrics are characterized by the consumed contaminated water of 162 
the WDS during the contamination events. A more resilient WQSPS indicates its better ability in 163 
detecting contamination events under different sensor failure levels and accordingly less 164 
contaminated water would be consumed. The (percentage) functionality loss of the WQSPS under 165 
























),,(                                               (1) 167 
where  tESFL ikL ,,  is the proportion of contaminated water that has been consumed relative to 168 
the total consumed water of the entire WDS under the intrusion event Ei (i=1,2,…,M, M is the 169 
total number of intrusion events) at time t for the sensor failure scenario k (k=1,2,…K, K is the 170 
total number of sensor failure scenarios) with L  failed sensors (referred as 
k
LS ); ),,( tESQ i
k
Lj  is 171 
the contaminated water that has been consumed at node j (j=1,2,…,N, N is the total number of 172 
nodes with demand users) and )(tDQ j  is the total water demands required by node j.  173 
Figure 1 further illustrates the proposed formulation of the global WQSPS resilience. As shown in 174 
this figure, the black solid curve line represents the dynamic behavior of the functionality level of 175 
the WDS (i.e., 1- ),,( tESFL i
k
L ) associated with the WQSPS over time for a given contamination 176 
event Ei starting at time 
s
it  and a given sensor failure scenario. It is seen that the functionality 177 
level of the WDS before the occurrence of the contamination event is 100%. This functionality 178 
level value consistently declines for the duration of the contamination event until this event is 179 
detected by the WQSPS within the WDS at time 
d
it . The shaded region A between 
s
it  and 
d
it  is 180 
the total functionality losses of the WDS (i.e., the consumed contaminated water) during this 181 
time period as indicated in Figure 1. If this contamination event cannot be detected by the 182 
WQSPS, the functionality level would gradually increase after a period of reduction as indicated 183 
by the black dotted line in Figure 1. This is because the contamination intrusion, especially the 184 
intentional contamination injections, often lasts a limited time period (e.g., 1 to 2 hours, see 185 
Ostfeld et al., 2016 and He et al., 2018) and hence the functionality level of the WQS can 186 
improve as the contaminated water is consumed over time. For this case, the total functionality 187 
losses of the WDS are the shaded region A+B above the black solid and dotted curve lines in 188 
Figure 1. 189 
 190 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the dynamic behavior of the WDS’s functionality level over time for a 191 
given contamination event and a given sensor failure scenario. 192 
For all M contamination events, the average of functionality levels (in percentage) of the WQSPS 193 
is developed as shown below 194 



















































T                                                     (3) 196 
where  kLSf  is the average of functionality levels (in percentage) of the WQSPS across M 197 
contamination events for the sensor failure scenario 
k

























































functionality losses for the intrusion event starting at time 
s
it  and ending at time iT , and this 199 
value is normalized between 0 and 1 through dividing it by the time difference between 
e
it  and 
s





it ), where 
e
it  is the time at which all the contaminated water within the WDS has been 201 
consumed without detected by the water quality sensors. As shown in Equation (3), if a 202 
contamination event Ei can be detected by any sensors with normal functionalities, iT  equals to 203 
d
it  which is the time at which any of the sensors first detects this event. If the contamination 204 
event cannot be detected, iT  is set to be 
e
it  which is the time when all the contaminated water 205 
have been consumed by customers. 206 
The rationale behind the use of the Equations (1) and (2) to represent the resilience of the 207 
WQSPS is that this formulation is able to simultaneously consider the impacts of sensor failures 208 
on the detection coverage and the time used to detect the contamination events, and the global 209 
resilience values are accordingly estimated when all possible failure scenarios are considered. In 210 
this study, three metrics are proposed to enable the global resilience assessment under a certain 211 
sensor failure level (L), which can be defined as follows 212 
  LfLR Smax)(max                                                               (4) 213 





)(mean                                                             (6) 215 
where )(min LR , )(max LR , )(LRmean  are the minimum, maximum and mean of global resilience 216 
values respectively for a given sensor failure level L;  Lf S  is the performance level function 217 
that is used to represent the resilience values of the WQSPSs and  TKLLLL SSS ,...,, 21S  is the set 218 
that contains all possible scenarios with L  failed sensors where K is the total number of sensor 219 
failure scenarios; the resilience value of each scenario 
k
LS  is computed using Equation (1). 220 
Based on the definition of the global resilience metrics in Equations (1-6), a more resilient WQSPS 222 
would possess overall lower total functionality losses of the WDS (the shaded region in Figure 1) 223 
when their sensors fail (considering different failure levels). It is noted that Figure 1 only illustrates 224 
the dynamic behavior of the functionality level variations of the WDS over time for one 225 
contamination event under a given sensor failure scenario. To enable the identification of the 226 
global resilience, a large number of contamination events (M) and all possible sensor failure 227 
scenarios (
LS ) need to be considered. The global resilience as proposed in this paper (Equations 228 
1-6) can have a value between 0 and 1, with a larger value representing that the WQSPS being 229 
considered is more resilient as it can maintain acceptable detection performance during 230 
unexpected conditions that lead to sensor failures. Two important assumptions are made in the 231 
proposed global resilience metrics following Ostfeld et al. (2008). These are that: (i) the 232 
functionality level of the WDS is not further reduced once the contamination event has been 233 
detected (the A shaded region in Figure 1) by the water quality sensors as all users can be 234 
quickly notified/warned to avoid consuming contaminated water, and (ii) the time period of the 235 
contamination injections is limited as this is often the case for many intentional/accidental 236 




2.1.2 Sensor failure scenarios 241 
As shown in Equations (4-6), 
LS  includes all possible failure scenarios for a given failure level L, 242 
leading to a total of ),( LTLC  failure scenarios (TL is the total number of sensors within the 243 
WDS). Taking a WDS with four water quality sensors (TL=4) as an example, the total number of 244 
scenarios involving a random failure of a single sensor is four ( 4)1,4( C ) as shown in Fig. 2. 245 
For failure levels of L =2, 3 and 4, the total number of scenarios are six, four and one 246 
respectively (see Fig. 2). Therefore, for this small WQSPS, the total number of failure scenarios 247 
is 15.  248 
 249 
Fig. 2. A schematic of sensor failure scenarios in a simple WDS with four sensors at 250 
























respectively, but only three scenarios are given each of these three failure levels for 252 
illustration purpose 253 
2.2 Resilience Assessment using EA-based optimization 254 
2.2.1 The EA-based method to identify global resilience values 255 
As stated in the previous section, for each failure level L, all possible failure scenarios have to be 256 
considered to enable the computation of the global resilience metrics (See Equations 4-6). 257 
However, enumerating all possible sensor failure scenarios is only applicable to WQSPS with a 258 
small number of sensors. For a relatively large WQSPS this is not tractable. For example, if 259 
WQSPS uses 30 sensors the total number of failure scenarios with L = 1 to 30 is 91007.1  . 260 
Simulating such a large number of scenarios requires massive computational resources, which 261 
would significantly go beyond the computational budgets that are typically available in practice. 262 
Therefore, the present study develops an efficient evolutionary algorithm based method (EAM) to 263 
identify the global resilience metric values (Equations 4-6) for different sensor failure levels.  264 
Figure 3 is used to illustrate the proposed EAM. For each given sensor failure level L, an EA is 265 
performed to identify the sensor failure scenario that has the largest detection ability of the 266 
remaining sensors of the WQSPS (Figure 3a), and the detection ability level is considered as the 267 
global resilience value Rmax in Equation (4). More specifically, a large number of initial solutions 268 
(sensor combinations with a given number of failed sensors L) are randomly generated, followed 269 
by solution evaluations (Equations 1-3) with the aid of EPANET2.0 as the hydraulic and water 270 
quality simulation model. These solutions are driven by the algorithm operations towards the 271 
maximum value of the detection ability levels (Figure 3a) until the final optimal solution (i.e., 272 
Rmax) is identified (Wu and Walski, 2006). Similarly, the EA is run again to determine the sensor 273 
failure scenario that has the lowest detection ability level of the remaining sensors of the WQSPS 274 
(Figure 3b), which is used to represent the global resilience value Rmin in Equation (5). All the 275 
individual members within the entire searching of the two optimization runs are used to estimate 276 
the mean value of the detection ability levels under sensor failures ( )(LRmean  in Equation 6), as 277 
shown in Fig. 3(c).  278 
  279 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the proposed EA-based optimization method (EAM) to identify the 280 
global resilience values for different sensor failure levels (L) 281 
2.2.2 The data-archive method to improve optimization efficiency 282 
In the proposed method, two EA optimization runs are performed for each sensor failure level, 283 
leading to a large number of EA runs as all different failure levels have to be considered. In 284 
addition, water quality simulation models need to be frequently called to enable the performance 285 
level computation (Equations 1-3) for each EA run, which are time-consuming especially for 286 





























paper to improve the computational efficiency of the optimization process. The data-archive 288 
method is based on the approach described in He et al. (2018) 289 
In the proposed data-archive method, a calibrated water quality model is first established, 290 
followed by the specification of simulation parameters such as simulation time step and duration 291 
time. Subsequently, all possible contamination scenarios (intrusion events) are defined by adding 292 
a contamination source with a given injection rate and a given time period to each node 293 
Ni ,,2,1  at different time within the total duration of a simulation described by demand 294 
patterns (DP). Therefore, the total number of contamination scenarios is DPN  . A water 295 
quality simulation is then executed with the pre-specified parameters for each pre-defined 296 
intrusion event. A data-archive is finally established to record the hydraulic and water quality 297 
simulation results that are required to enable the calculation of the performance levels as a result 298 
of sensor failures. However, it should be noted that the proposed data-archive approach is used to 299 
reduce the need for calling a water quality simulation model for each EA function evaluation 300 
conditioned on a predefined set of contamination characteristics (e.g., intrusion concentration 301 
and duration). This implies that the data archive needs to be re-developed if the intrusion 302 
characteristics are changed. This is a limitation of the proposed data-archive approach that needs 303 
to be addressed in future. The details of the proposed method for the development of data 304 
archives are shown by the pseudo-code in Figure 4 below.  305 
Step 0: Set up the water quality simulation model for the WDS. 
Step 1: Specify the simulation parameters, including the water quality time step, contamination injection 
quantity, injection time period, concentration threshold and total simulation duration time. 
Step 2: Define all the possible contamination intrusion events for each demand node Nj ,,2,1  (N is 
the total number of demand nodes) at time 
DPtttt ,...,, 21  (DP is the length of demand pattern) 
as ],...,,[ 21 MEEE ( DPNM  ). 
FOR Mi ,...,2,1  
Step 3: Perform the water quality simulation with the pre-specified parameters for the intrusion 
event iE  (the start time of the injection and which node is to be injected) 
  FOR TLm ,...,2,1 (TL is the total number of sensors) 
                     Step 4: Perform the water quality simulation model for the intrusion event iE  with the pre-
specified total duration time 
                                      If iE  can be detected by the m
th sensor  
d
ii tT   
Otherwise  
e
ii tT   
FOR tBttt  ,...,2,,0  
( tBTi  ) 
Step 5: Perform the water quality simulation model at time t, and record 
),,( 1- tESQ i
m
TLj  and )(tDQ j  for each demand node j, where 
m
TLS 1-  represents 
that only the mth sensor is considered and the all the other sensors are failed 
(i.e., the failure level is TL-1). This is followed by the use of Equation (1) to  
calculate and record ),,( tESFL i
k
L  for each t. 
                       END t 








TL dttESFL ,,1  in Equation (2), which equals to the total values of 
),,( tESFL i
k
L  across different time.  
Step 7: Develop a data-archive for the event of iE  and the sensor m, referred to 













           END m 
END i 
Fig. 4. The pseudo-code of the development of the data archives in the proposed method  306 
Relative to the data-archive method stated in He et al. (2018) that only recorded the time of each 307 
sensor in detecting each of the contamination events (
d
it ), the archive structure used in this paper 308 













i dttESFLTtt ,, and ,,, 1  as shown in the pseudo-code (Figure 4). The application 310 
procedures of the developed data archives within the optimization framework are outlined in 311 
Figure 5 by pseudo codes. As shown in Figure 5, a total of Pop initial solutions is first randomly 312 
generated for each sensor failure level (L), followed by solution evaluations for all M intrusion 313 
events based on Equations 1-3. The individuals that are survived from the selection operator are 314 
subject to cross and mutation operations, and the generated offspring are driven by the EA 315 
operations towards the optimal value until the final optimal solution is identified.  316 
FOR L=1, 2,…, TL 
     FOR n=1, 2,…, Pop (Pop is the population size of the evolutionary algorithm, representing a 
sensor failure scenario with TL-L valid sensors) 
FOR Mi ,...,2,1 ( M is the total number of intrusion events) 
Step 1: Identify the sensor m that has the minimum value of iT  information recorded 
at the data archive ( ) from all TL-L valid sensors.  























-1  in Equation (2). 
            END i 
Step 3: Compute and record  kLSf  in Equation (2) using all the values recorded in 
Step 2. 
END n 
Step 4: Carry out the algorithm operators to lead the search towards identifying the 
minimum or maximum resilience values as defined in Equations 4 and 5. All 
the recorded values in Step 3 over different EA iterations are used to 
compute the mean of the global resilience values in Equation (6).  
END L 
Fig. 5. The pseudo-code of the applications of the data archives in the proposed method  317 
2.3 Sensor Ranking 318 
In the proposed method, the sensors are ranked based on their impact on the global resilience 319 
values obtained using methodology shown in the above section, thereby indicating their relative 320 
importance in affecting the performance of the WQSPS induced by their failures. More 321 
specifically, the frequency of the sensors associated with the lowest global resilience values 322 
across different failure levels is used to enable the ranking, with details represented by the two 323 





















   ,1
),(  (8) 
where )(iPs  is the probability of the sensor i that has been identified to be included in the failure 325 
scenarios associated with the lowest reliance values (Rmin) over all different failure levels; TL is the 326 
total number of sensors; ),( Li  is an indicator function, with 1),( Li  if the sensor i  is in the 327 
failure scenario of Rmin at the failure level L, which is identified by the EA-based optimization 328 
method, otherwise 0),( Li . For example, if a sensor is selected three times in the failure 329 
scenario of Rmin relative to a total of six failure levels, it has a )(iPs =50%. As shown in Equation 330 
(7), a sensor with a larger value of )(iPs  indicates that this sensor is overall more important as its 331 
failure is likely to induce more serious consequences relative to the sensors with low )(iPs  332 
values. Such knowledge is practically important as it can be used as guidance for the 333 
management and maintenance of water quality sensor systems.  334 
3. Case Studies 335 
3.1. Description 336 
Two real-world WDSs in China, the Jiayou network (JYN) and the Zhuohao network (ZHN), are 337 
selected as case studies to demonstrate the proposed EA-based global resilience assessment 338 
method. The JYN consists of two reservoirs, 349 demand nodes and 509 pipes with many loops 339 
(Figure 6), and The ZHN has one reservoir, 3,439 demand nodes and 3,512 pipes with many 340 
branches (Figure 7). Both WDSs have a demand pattern varying over 24 hours, with each hour 341 
representing a demand scenario. The JYN and ZHN network supplies approximately 256,592 m3 342 
per day and 140,782 m3 per day respectively. Six and 30 water quality sensors (He et al. 2018) are 343 
available for JYN and ZHN, respectively. Four different water quality sensor placement 344 
strategies (WQSPSs) have been identified for each case study as shown in Figures 6 and 7. These 345 
four WQSPSs were identified by He et al. (2018) who used an optimization algorithm. Different 346 
contamination probability functions were considered to enable the WQSPS optimization. More 347 
specifically, the WQSPS1, WQSPS2, WQSPS3 and WQSPS4 for both case studies were 348 
determined using the equal contamination probability function at each node, the probability 349 
function based on nodal demands, the probability function based on length of pipes immediately 350 
connected to the contaminated nodes, and the probability function based on user properties, 351 
respectively (see He et al. (2018) for details). This study aims to investigate the global resilience 352 
of the four WQSPSs with sensor failures considered, thereby facilitating the selection of the 353 
resilient sensor deployment methods.  354 
 355 
Figure 6 The network typology of the JYN case study with four water quality sensor 356 
placement strategies (WQSPSs) 357 
(a) WQSPS1 (b) WQSPS2
(c) WQSPS3 (d) WQSPS4
Water quality sensors
 358 
Figure 7 The network typology of the ZHN case study with four water quality sensor 359 
placement strategies (WQSPSs) 360 
3.2 Application of the proposed method 361 
The EPANET2.0 was used as the hydraulic and water quality simulation model in this study. For 362 
each case study, a total duration of 96 hours (four times of the 24-hour demand pattern) with a 363 
time step of 5 minutes was used to simulate each contamination scenario. Following Ostfeld et al. 364 
(2008), a contamination scenario was represented by adding a contamination source to a node 365 
(a) WQSPS1 (b) WQSPS2
(c) WQSPS3 (d) WQSPS4
with an injection rate of 100 mg/L of two-hour duration. Consequently, the total numbers of 366 
contamination scenarios for JYN and ZHN case studies were 24   349 = 8,376 and 24   3439 = 367 
82,536, respectively. The detection threshold of water quality sensors was set to 0.01 mg/L 368 
following He et al. (2018). It is noted that as each node of the WDS was considered as the 369 
intrusion injection location at a wide range of injection time, it is believed that the defined 370 
contamination events were representative following the description in Tinelli et al. (2017). 371 
In the present study, the evolutionary algorithm Borg (Hadka and Reed, 2013; Zheng et al., 372 
2016), which has been successfully and widely used to deal with various water resources 373 
optimization problems, was employed to solve the proposed optimization problem. The 374 
population size of Borg applied to JYN and ZHN case studies were 500 and 1,000 respectively 375 
following the parameters used in He et al. (2018), and the maximum allowable number of 376 
evaluations was 500,000 for both case studies. The values of the remaining parameters of Borg 377 
were the default selections in Wang et al. (2014), which have been validated and verified through 378 
various applications. Five runs of the Borg with random number seeds were applied to each case 379 
study, and the results were overall similar among different runs.  380 
3.3 The traditional global resilience analysis (TGRA) approach 381 
The traditional global resilience analysis (TGRA) approach has been widely used to assess the 382 
resilience of various systems as a result of malfunctions (e.g., pipe breaks), such as electrical 383 
power systems (Johansson, 2010), urban drainage systems (Mugume et al., 2015) and water 384 
distribution systems (Diao et al., 2016). To demonstrate the capacity of the proposed EA-based 385 
method, its performance is compared with the TGRA presented in Diao et al. (2016) in terms of 386 
their ability to capture the global resilience values.  387 
The TGRA provided a response curve (envelope) that represented the range of resilience 388 
(corresponding Equations 4-6) under increasing failure levels by evaluating a limited number of 389 
failure scenarios. When only one sensor in WDS failed (i.e., the failure level 1L ), it required 390 
each sensor to be traversed and hence a total of M failure scenarios needed to be evaluated. 391 
When all the sensors failed ( TLL  ), there was only one failure scenario to be considered. For 392 
TLL 1 , the TGRA involved two different types of failure scenario selections, which were 393 
targeted failure type and random failure type (Diao et al., 2016). The targeted failure scenarios 394 
were determined through an incremental manner, where the sensor with the largest/lowest impact 395 
on the performance of WQSPS was incrementally added to the failure scenario as the failure 396 
level increased. The random failure scenario selection aimed to enrich the targeted failure 397 
scenarios through selecting the locations of L  failed sensors randomly, thereby improving the 398 
likelihood to identify the near-optimal failure scenarios that have the largest or lowest global 399 
resilience values. Details of the TGRA can be found in Mugume et al. (2015) and Diao et al 400 
(2016). 401 
4. Results and discussions 402 
4.1 Comparison between the proposed EAM and the TGRA 403 
The values of the three global resilience metrics defined in Equations (4-6) were identified by the 404 
proposed EAM and the TGRA respectively, with results given in Figures 8 (JYN) and 9 (ZHN). 405 
For the JYN with a relatively small number of sensors (six), it was seen that the proposed EAM 406 
exhibited similar performance with the TGRA in terms of Rmax, Rmin and Rmean values for each 407 
failure level applied to the four sensor placement strategies (SPSs). To further verify the 408 
effectiveness of the proposed EAM, all the possible failure scenarios for each failure level were 409 
fully enumerated to enable the identification of the global values of the global resilience metrics, 410 
with results also shown in Figure 8 (the EM). It is observed that while the Rmean values were 411 
slightly different between the proposed EAM and the EM, the Rmax and Rmin values identified by 412 
the EAM consistently matched those from the EM. This was also the case for the traditional global 413 
resilience analysis method (TGRA) as shown in Figure 8. Using the results of the JYN case study 414 
with six sensors, it can be deduced that the proposed EAM was effective in identifying the global 415 
resilience values.  416 




































































































Fig. 8. Global resilience metric values of different failure levels applied to the four different 418 
WQSPSs of the JYN study 419 
Interestingly, when the methods were applied to the ZHN with 30 sensors (Figure 9), the 420 
envelope results produced by the EAM results consistently outperformed those from the TGRA 421 
across all sensor levels. This was especially the case for the Rmin as the proposed EAM was able 422 
to identify sensor failure scenarios with substantially more serious impacts on the WQSPS’s 423 
detection performance compared to the TGRA. For instance, if 20 sensors failed for the SPS2 424 
(Figure 9(b)), the value of Rmin identified by the proposed EAM was 0.78, but the TGRA offered 425 
a value of Rmin=0.84. This indicated that the TGRA can significantly underestimate the potential 426 
impacts of sensor failures on the detection performance of the water quality sensor systems. As 427 
shown in Figure 9, the advantage of the proposed EAM relative to the TGRA became more 428 
prominent for failure levels (L) between 10-20 (i.e., the number of failed sensors were between 429 
10 and 20) for all the four WQSPSs. This was expected as the total search space for the L 430 
between 10 and 20 was appreciably larger than other failure levels, and hence the TGRA had a 431 
lower likelihood to identify the global resilience metric values (minimum or maximum values) 432 
relative to the proposed EAM.  433 
 434 
Fig. 9. Global resilience metric values of different failure levels applied to the four different 435 
WQSPSs of the ZHN case study 436 
To reveal the underlying mechanisms that caused the performance variation between the 437 
proposed EAM and the TGRA, Figure 10 presents the locations of the failed sensors at four 438 
different failure levels (L) identified by these two methods applied to WQSPS1 of the ZHN case 439 
study based on Rmin metric. As shown in this figure, at L = 3, the locations of the three sensors 440 
with their failures having the largest impacts of the WQSPS1’s detection performance were 441 
identical between these two methods (Figure 10a). However, for the EAM identified failure 442 
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compared to the failure scenario with L=3, and two new sensors have been added to the failure 444 
scenario with L=4. However, for the TGRA, only one more sensor has been added to its already 445 
identified failure scenario based on Rmin metric when L=4. This was also the case when L 446 
increased to 5 and 15 as shown in Figure 9(c,d). This was because the TGRA selected the failed 447 
sensors mainly using an incremental (greedy) manner, where the sensor whose failure has the 448 
largest impacts on the WQSPS’s detection performance was incrementally added to the failure 449 
scenario as the failure level increased. Therefore, the identified failed sensors were highly likely 450 
to be trapped in a local solution. In contrast, the proposed EAM identified failed sensors 451 
independently for each failure level, and hence it was able to find improved global resilience 452 
metric values compared to the TGRA, especially for the large and complex problems (Figure 9).  453 
 454 
Fig. 10. Locations of sensors (to whose failure the resilience is sensitive) identified by the 455 
proposed EAM and TGRA methods applied to WQSPS1 (Figure 7) of the ZHN based on 456 
Rmin metric 457 
In terms of computational analysis, the computational budgets of the proposed EAM were 458 
primarily used by the generation of data archive that involved water quality simulations. For the 459 
ZHN case study, the total number of contamination scenarios considered was the value computed 460 
by the number of nodes (3,439) multiplied with the number of demand patterns (24), leading to a 461 
total of 82,536 events. Using a PC with 4.00-GHz Intel Core i9-7980XE processor in Windows 462 
(a) L=3 (b) L=4
(c) L=5 (d) L=15
Water quality sensorsThe EAM
The TGRA
10, the total time for simulating these events for data archive development was 19.6 hours (note 463 
that data archive only needed to be developed once). Within the optimization process, the 464 
established data archive, rather than the water quality simulator, was used to enable the objective 465 
function evaluations. Consequently, the optimization process was very efficient with a total of 466 
approximately 0.5 hours for all optimization runs. Therefore, the total computational time used to 467 
identify the global resilience metric values for the ZHN case study was 20.1 hours, which is 468 
practically affordable. For the TGRA, a total of 11,679 sensor failure scenarios was identified 469 
using the method described in Diao et al. (2016), and for each scenario, all the 82,536 470 
contamination events had to be simulated to enable the objective function evaluations. The 471 
estimated computational time was 229,261 hours or about 9,500 days (11,67919.6 hours used 472 
for the simulating 82,536 contamination events), which is impossible to complete. Therefore, the 473 
established data archive was also used by the TGRA to produce the results, and hence the total 474 
computational time of the TGRA was similar to that used by the proposed EAM (the main 475 
computational budgets of each method were used by the data archive establishment). This was 476 
also the case for the small JYN case study. However, the proposed EAM can produce 477 
significantly better results for the large ZHN case study compared to the TGRA as shown in 478 
Figure 9. 479 
4.2 Resilience comparison across different WQSPSs 480 
Figure 11 shows the global resilience metric (Rmin, Rmax and Rmean) values of each WQSPS for the 481 
two case studies over all different failure levels (L). All these values were divided by R0 (the 482 
global resilience value of WQSPS without sensor failures) to enable the performance comparison 483 
of the four WQSPSs. As shown in Figure 11, for each case study, the R0 values were overall 484 
similar for the four WQSPSs, implying that the difference of the detection performance of the 485 
four WQSPSs without any sensor failures was negligible.  486 
As expected, the detection performances of the four WQSPSs were consistently reduced as 487 
measured by the three global resilience metric values when the failure level increased for both 488 
case studies. Among the four WQSPSs, the WQSPS2 had an overall greater ability in 489 
maintaining its detection performance for both case studies under different failure levels 490 
compared to its counterparts. In contrast, the WQSPS4 exhibited the worst performance for the 491 
two case studies as it consistently exhibited the fastest performance deterioration in Rmin and 492 
Rmean induced by sensor failures with different levels.  493 
 494 
Fig. 11. Global resilience metric values of the four WQSPSs under all failure levels (L) for 495 
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The rationale behind the observations made above was that the WQSPS2 was identified based on 497 
deploying sensors closer to large demand users (He et al. 2018). Therefore, the contamination 498 
events at these large demand nodes that could result in large functionality losses of the WDS can 499 
be detected in an efficient manner. Consequently, this sensor deployment strategy (WQSPS2) 500 
tended to be overall more resilient as measured by the proposed global resilience metrics. While 501 
the WQSPS4 also considered the demand values within its deployment, many sensors were 502 
located exactly at the important users such as hospitals and schools as stated in He et al. (2018) 503 
(this was the main difference between WQSPS2 and WQSPS4). Consequently, the global 504 
resilience of this deployment strategy can be significantly reduced if the sensors at the important 505 
users simultaneously failed. Therefore, the WQSPS2 was identified as the most resilient system 506 
for both the JYN and ZHN case studies in dealing with sensor failures.  507 
Another interesting observation from Figure 11 is that while WQSPS2 exhibited the overall best 508 
performance in global resilience metric values across different failure levels, this sensor 509 
deployment strategy performed similarly with the other three alternatives when the failure level 510 
was low, such as L between 1 and 3. This is because many contamination events can be detected 511 
by multiple sensors with relatively small time differences due to the looped water delivery 512 
manner as well as relative large sensor density (e.g., 30 sensors for the ZHN). Consequently, the 513 
relatively low sensor failure levels (e.g., L=2) would not induce significant variations across 514 
different WQSPSs given that their initial detection ability levels were overall similar. This 515 
implies that the global resilience that accounts for all possible failure scenarios (as it was done in 516 
this study) can provide knowledge/insights, which goes beyond the resilience analysis only 517 
considering limited failure scenarios (e.g., L between 1 and 3) as did in the majority of previous 518 
studies (Preis and Ostfeld 2008, Berry et al. 2009).  519 
4.3 Ranking the sensors within the WQSPSs  520 
The sensors of the WQSPS2 for the JYN and the ZHN (identified as the most resilient design 521 
solutions in the previous section) were ranked based on the Rmin values of all different failure 522 
levels, with results given in Figure 12. It was seen that Sensor 5 was selected in all failure 523 
scenarios (100% probability to be included in the failure scenarios) associated with Rmin within 524 
the WQSPS2 of the JYN (Figure 12(c)), and hence this sensor was crucial in maintaining the 525 
overall detection performance of the sensor system (the locations of Sensor 5 was shown in 526 
Figure 12(a)). Sensor 4 was selected in addition to Sensor 5 as the two sensors that have the 527 
largest impact on the WQSPS2 detection performance due to their simultaneous failures, i.e., 528 
L=2, as shown in Figure 12(c). For the WQSPS2 of the ZHN case study (ranks of only six 529 
sensors were presented to enable clear visualization), Sensor 29 (Figure 12(b)) was the most 530 
important sensor as it was consistently selected to be included in the failure scenarios that 531 
produced Rmin (100% probability in Figure 12(d)). This was followed by Sensor 18 as it was 532 
always selected from L=2 to 30 as shown in Figure 12(d). Detailed analysis of results revealed 533 
that sensors with a relatively high rank were either located in the surrounding regions of the 534 
large/important demand users or deployed in a region with sparse sensors. For example, Sensor 8 535 
of the ZHN case study (low ranking with a relatively low probability) was only selected when L 536 
was relatively large as shown in Figure 12(b,d). This was because this sensor was located at the 537 
downstream end of the WDS and hence the impact of its failure on the WQSPS’s detection 538 
performance can be relatively small when compared to other sensors located in the middle of the 539 
WDS.  540 
The results of the sensor rankings based on the Rmin are practically significant as this knowledge 541 
can be used as guidance to enable the effective water quality sensor maintenance management. 542 
For instance, for the WQSPS2 of the JYN, Sensor 5 needed to be maintained more frequently 543 
than other sensors as its failure consistently resulted in larger performance reduction of the 544 
WQSPS over different failure levels. This was also the case for Sensor 29 within the WQSPS2 of 545 
the ZHN case study. From the practical point of view, the number of simultaneously failed 546 
sensors often ranged between 2 to 4, and for such cases, the ranking results obtained from the 547 
global resilience analysis can also inform the sensors whose failures have the largest impacts on 548 
the WQSPS’s overall detection performance. For example, if L=2 was considered for the two 549 
case studies, Sensors 5 and 4 for the JYN and Sensors 29 and 19 for the ZHN were identified as 550 




















































































































































Fig. 12. Sensor rankings based on the Rmin of all the failure levels for both case studies, 553 
where )(iPs  is the probability of the sensor i that has been identified to be included in the 554 
failure scenarios associated with the lowest reliance values.  555 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 556 
In this section, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the impacts of the EA runs and 557 
intrusion characteristics on the values of the global resilience metrics and sensor rankings. It is 558 
noted that the parameters of the Borg were default values based on a comprehensive sensitivity 559 
analysis performed in previous studies (Hadka and Reed, 2013; Zheng et al., 2016) and hence the 560 
parameterization strategies of Borg were not explored in this paper. This is also partly because 561 
Borg was only used as an optimization tool in the proposed method, rather than the research 562 
focus of this study. Specifically, for each case study, five different invasion scenarios were 563 
considered, which were 50 mg/L intrusion concentration with 1 hour duration, 100 mg/L 564 
intrusion concentration with 1 hour duration, 100mg/L intrusion concentration with 2 hour 565 
duration, 100 mg/L intrusion concentration with 3 hour duration, and 150 mg/L intrusion 566 
concentration with 2 hour duration. For each invasion scenario, the proposed EA-based method 567 
was run five times with different starting random seeds. Therefore, a total of 25 Borg runs were 568 
performed invasion scenario, leading to 25 global resilience metric values (Rmax, Rmean and Rmin) 569 
and sensor rankings over all different failure levels. 570 
Figure 13 presents the boxplot of global resilience metric values for the large ZHN case study 571 
over all different failure levels. It can be observed from this figure that the variability of the 572 
global resilience metric values was insignificant, which was especially the case for the relatively 573 
low sensor failure levels. For instance, in terms of Rmin value, the largest variability occurred for 574 
the sensor failure level L=24 with a maximum difference of 0.11 (from 0.69 to 0.80). Figure 14 575 
shows the boxplot of sensor rankings based on the Rmin values of all the failure levels calculated 576 
from the 25 solutions for the ZHN case study. As shown in this figure, the rankings of the 577 
sensors that were associated with a high probability %80)( iPs  were not affected by the choices 578 
of different invasion scenarios and starting random number seeds for Borg. However, for the 579 
sensors with a moderate value of )(iPs  between 40% 60%, moderate variations were observed. 580 
Similar observations were made for the small JYN case study. 581 
  582 
Fig. 13. Boxplot of global resilience metric (Rmax, Rmean and Rmin) values based on 25 Borg 583 
runs for the ZHN case study with five different invasion scenarios and five staring random 584 
number seeds over all different failure levels. 585 


















Fig. 14. Boxplot of sensor rankings based on the Rmin of all the failure levels calculated 587 
based on the 25 solutions for the ZHN case study, where )(iPs  is the probability of the 588 
sensor i that has been identified to be included in the failure scenarios associated with the 589 
lowest reliance values 590 
5. Summary and conclusions 591 
A contamination early warning system is typically used to protect the water quality safety of a 592 
water distribution system (WDS), where the water quality sensors are spatially distributed to 593 
detect/warn contamination events. The majority of the current research focuses on identifying the 594 
water quality sensor placement strategy (WQSPSs) based on an assumption that all sensors are 595 
able to consistently provide accurate measurements, i.e., measure, record and communicate. 596 
However, water quality sensors are generally vulnerable to their surrounding environment and 597 
hence their failure likelihoods are often not insignificant. Therefore, it is critical to design a 598 
resilient WQSPS that cannot only detect contamination events with great effectiveness when all 599 
sensors are functioning normally, but also can maintain reasonable performance when sensors 600 
fail. However, few attempts have been made so far to explore the WQSPS’s resilience 601 
(%
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considering sensor failures, especially for the global resilience that should account for all 602 
possible failure scenarios.  603 
This paper proposes a method to systematically assess the global resilience of WQSPSs with 604 
sensor failures considered. In the proposed method, new metrics are firstly developed to represent 605 
the global resilience of WQSPSs under different sensor failure levels (i.e., the number of 606 
simultaneously failed sensors), where all possible sensor failure scenarios are considered 607 
irrespective of their occurrence probability. Subsequently, an efficient Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) 608 
based optimization approach is proposed to effectively identify the values of the global resilience 609 
metrics for different sensor failure levels. Finally, the sensors within the WQSPS are ranked based 610 
on their global resilience values. Two real-world WDSs with four WQSPSs for each WDS 611 
analyzed are used to demonstrate the utility of the proposed global resilience identification method. 612 
Based on the results obtained the following observations/implications can be made:  613 
(i) The proposed EA-based optimization method (EAM) was able to identify improved 614 
values of the global resilience metrics relative to the traditional global resilience analysis 615 
(TGRA) method that has been widely used so far for the WDS with a large number of 616 
sensors (Mugume et al., 2015, Diao et al., 2016). The advantage of the proposed EAM is 617 
more prominent when dealing with WQSPSs with a large number of sensors. This 618 
implied that the TGRA results may underestimate the potentially extreme 619 
impacts/consequences of the sensor failures on the WQSPS’s detection performance, and 620 
this issue has been addressed using the proposed EAM.  621 
(ii) It was observed that the WQSPSs designed based on deploying sensors relatively closer 622 
to large demand users (WQSPS2) were overall more resilient in dealing with sensor 623 
failures compared to other design solutions according to the definition of the global 624 
resilience metrics (Rmean). However, the findings of this paper also showed that deploying 625 
sensors very close to large users or important users (e.g., hospitals or schools) can also 626 
risky as their failures can significantly reduce the detection performance of the WQSPS. 627 
These insights were practically informative as it can be used to facilitate the selection of 628 
WQSPSs for the WDS. 629 
(iii) The sensor ranking based on the global resilience metric values (Rmin) can identify the 630 
important sensors whose failures would significantly reduce the WQSPS performance at 631 
different failure levels. In addition, a sensitivity analysis showed that these rankings were 632 
not significantly affected by the intrusion properties (injection concentrations and 633 
durations). Such knowledge can provide guidance to enable efficient and effective water 634 
quality sensor management as the highly ranked sensors were prioritized for maintenance 635 
due to their large impacts on WQSPS’s detection performance.  636 
It should be noted that global resilience of identified optimal WQSPSs was assessed in the 637 
current paper as suggested by previous studies (Mugume et al., 2015, Diao et al., 2016). This was 638 
done post WQSPS optimization as incorporating such a methodology directly into the 639 
optimization process would be extremely computationally expensive. It is acknowledged that 640 
assessing the global resilience of WQSPS post-optimization rather than optimizing for global 641 
resilience in the first place may result in sub-optimal solutions. Having said this, the proposed 642 
method is still of high practical significance as the identification of sub-optimal solutions using 643 
manageable computational efforts is often sufficient for real-world water resources problems 644 
(Maier et al. 2014). Still, future studies should extend the proposed method to identify the most 645 
resilient solutions considering sensor failures within the WQSPS design optimization process.  646 
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